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The year 2016 was an internal and external test for Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani. The February legislative elections represented strong support for
his administration and the nuclear accord with the P5+1 group of nations.
But the lack of visible improvements at the economic level, the increasing
internal criticism from the hardliners, and the demise of Hashemi
Rafsanjani, the second most powerful man in Iran, made this the most
difficult year of Rouhani’s tenure so far. At the international level, the
confrontationist policy towards Saudi Arabia and direct military
involvement in Syria caused a deterioration in the country’s external image,
generating an increasing regional isolationism, despite the successful
conclusion of the nuclear deal. The implementation of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action in January brought to an end the nuclear-
related international sanctions and started a slow and gradual process of
Iranian normalization within the international commercial and financial
markets. However, the election of US President Donald Trump and his
impending inauguration in 2017 introduced measures that would potentially
endanger the continuity of the US-Iran honeymoon.
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1. Introduction
The year 2016 proved to be a very difficult year for Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani’s administration, which faced challenges both from abroad
and from within the country. The external challenges were represented by
increasing tension in the region following events related to the wars in Syria,
Yemen, and Iraq and the diplomatic escalation with Saudi Arabia and the rest
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab states. In this regard, the
year started with attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in
Mashhad, on 2 January, which escalated already high tensions with
neighbouring Saudi Arabia. The diplomatic rift added to Iran’s direct
involvement in the Syrian conflict, which deeply affected the Iranian image
within the Middle East region. Nonetheless, implementation of the
multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA)
on 16 January represented the most positive aspect of Iranian foreign policy,
since the Iranian authorities demonstrated their serious commitment in
regard to the international community. In the US, the presidential election of
Donald Trump, with his very aggressive stance against Iran and his declared
intention of reviewing/cancelling the JCPOA, also created some concern
within Iran in the prelude to the presidential election in May 2017, which
may affect the chances for Rouhani to be re-elected.
Internally, the February legislative elections signalled strong support
for Rouhani’s project, though not a reformist return to politics. In the
economic sphere, to date few achievements can be attributed to the JCPOA
and the lifting of economic sanctions.
The death on 9 January 2017 of Hashemi Rafsanjani, a key figure in
the history of the Islamic Republic, represented the end of a year that will
leave the country under uncertainties for the following year in which
Rouhani expects to be re-elected on May 19th. Moreover, bearing in mind the
still unclear policy that Donald Trump will implement regarding Iran, his
February 2017 temporary ban on Iranian nationals travelling to the US can
provide some signals about his stance.
2. Domestic policies
President Hassan Rouhani experienced a difficult year of domestic
performance in 2016. Even though the February legislative elections
represented clear popular support in regard to the JCPOA, three key factors
may leave Rouhani in an uncertain position for 2017, including his chances
for re-election on May 19. First, pressure from conservative sectors forced a
reshaping of the cabinet; second, increasing discontent is evident from a
population that is losing patience with the promised but as yet
unaccomplished benefits of lifting sanctions; and finally, the decease of
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Hashemi Rafsanjani, undoubtedly Rouhani’s strongest supporter, removed
an element of political support for the president.
2.1. The February legislative elections
Legislative elections for the Iranian Majlis (parliament) were held in
two rounds, on 26 February, when 220 seats were filled, and on 29 April, to
fill the remaining 70 seats. These elections were held jointly with the
Assembly of Experts elections to choose the 88 clerical members of the
collegiate body which has the important function of choosing, confirming
the annual performance, and even removing the Supreme Leader of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Similar to previous legislative processes, 2016 will be remembered for
the controversy surrounding the application vetting process. Most first- and
second-line reformist candidates as well as many ultraconservatives such as
Hamid Resaei were left out of the legislative electoral race after being
rejected by the Guardian Council. Even more controversial was the rejection
of the application of Hassan Khomeini,1 grandson of the Republic’s founder,
allegedly due to his refusal to attend an aptitude exam to aspire for a seat in
the Assembly of Experts. Nonetheless, most understood that his proximity to
figures from the reformist and moderate camps, such as Mohammad
Khatami, Rouhani, and Rafsanjani, was the real political motivation behind
his disqualification. In spite of these controversies, the 2016 election had the
most applicants in the history of Iranian legislative elections: 12,123
compared to 5,405 in 2012, 7,129 in 2008, and 8,172 in 20042. It is also true
that despite the historically low acceptance rate (51.3%), the number of
accepted candidates who contested the 290 seats – 6,229 candidates,
including 586 women – was the highest number ever. The figure was even
higher than in 2000, the year when the reformists gained control over the
chamber.
The peculiarity of the Iranian electoral system, which allows citizens
to vote in any polling station in the country without prior registration, as well
as the characteristics of the individual candidacies and lists, make it difficult
to properly assess the electoral process as a whole. The international press
referred to the existence of three major lists in the legislative elections: the
«principlists», or conservatives; the «reformists and moderates», and the
1 Surprisingly, Hassan Khomeini received 55,000 votes in the Assembly of Experts race
despite the fact that he was disqualified; he received the second-highest number of votes
for the Bushehr district, according to Ensaf News. See ‘ ار رازھ دنچیس مان ھبنسحدیمخینی رد
؟رھشوب’ (‘A few thousand votes to Hassan Khomeini in Iran?’), Ensaf News, 12 Esfand 1394
(2 March 2016) (http://www.ensafnews.com/23486).
2 Luciano Zaccara, ‘Who won the Iranian elections?’, OPEMAM Analysis, 3 March 2016.
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«Voice of the Nation». The latter group comprises conservatives critical of
the administration of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and who
have supported some initiatives of President Rouhani, among them the
nuclear agreement. However, the lists, which were many more than these
three, are ambiguous and flexible, allowing the same candidate to be on more
than one list simultaneously, as has happened in previous elections. The case
of Ali Motahari, leader of the Voice of the Nation and main candidate on its
list for Tehran, was the clearest in this election, since his name was also
included on the reformist list, together with Reza Aref and other allies of
Rouhani, Rafsanjani, and Khatami. Other conservative candidates allied with
Ali Larijani, the incumbent parliament speaker, also appeared on the
reformist lists. As confirmed by some interviews conducted in Tehran among
key reformist figures, since there were not enough reformist or moderate
candidates, their squad leaders proposed to other independent or conservative
candidates who shared common support for the policies implemented by
Rouhani that they appear in the «Reformist Alliance» list.3 This means that
not all those who appeared on the reformist lists were in fact reformist, nor
even that they accepted being on those lists, as was the case of Motahari, who
explicitly denied having agreed to be included in the reformist list or having
invited reformists to join his own list.
Regarding the results, the official 62% participation rate was
marginally lower than the 64% turnout in 20124, but significantly lower than
the 72% in the presidential elections in 20135. Despite noticeable public
apathy at the beginning of the electoral campaign, in the end Iranians
massively headed to the polling stations, even those who declared that they
were not interested or were against the current system. Apparently, despite
the aforementioned controversies, there is still room for political debate
which is visible in the streets, universities, and the written press. The latter,
especially, which reflects the views of the different factions and coalitions
taking part in the elections, offered all types of comments, interviews, and
pre-electoral statistics – though with little reliability, due to these
publications’ partisan and factional bias.
Official Iranian television and printed press outlets made an effort to
highlight how the reformist list was able to win the 30 disputed seats in the
Tehran district, a fact characterized by many foreign media as a reformist
3 Interview with Sadegh Zibakalam, Professor of Political Science at Tehran University,
Tehran, February 2016.
4 See ‘2012 Parliamentary Elections’, Iran Data Portal (http://irandataportal.syr.edu/2012-
parliamentary-elections).
5 See Ministry of Interior, ‘یروھمج تسایر تاباختنا هرود نیمھدزای ییاھن شرازگ’ (‘Final Report of
the 11th Presidential Elections’)
(https://www.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=cc1955c9-
7610-428d-b15c-fafc947cc884&WebPartID=47942904-35b9-4ecc-bfc4-
4d6d3bee26d8&ID=ab52b9a8-e2a6-41e4-bbcc-15665125a6b2).
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victory and the beginning of a change in Iran.6 Still, taking into account what
was mentioned before, many of the reformists that appear on the Reformist
Alliance lists cannot be considered as such even though most of the Iranian
press reproduced the figures mentioned in the table below. However, the fact
that Hadad Adel lost his seat in Tehran can certainly be considered as big
setback for the conservatives. The defeat of this historical head of the
conservative list and former speaker of parliament means that at least in the
capital the popular support has drifted away from the conservatives. Another
aspect that must be highlighted is that Mohammad Reza Aref, the only
reformist representative stricto sensu, received the most votes among all
candidates in the country, at 1,6 million votes,7 a success which strengthened
him against the conservative political establishment.
Majlis composition, 2016–2020.
List/Group Number of seats
United Fundamentalist Front 84
Reformist Alliance 122
UFF/RA 3
Voice of the Nation 10
Independents 65
Religious minorities 5
Total 289*
Source: Author’s compilation based on several Iranian press sources.
Note: * The result in one Isfahan province district was cancelled.8
Despite the arguable popular support for reformist candidates, the
flexibility and changeability of intra-parliamentarian alliances were
demonstrated once again during the first voting process to choose the speaker
of the Majlis. On 29 May, Mohammad Reza Aref lost the vote for the
temporary speakership when he received only 103 votes compared to the 173
that the incumbent speaker Ali Larijani obtained. The number of votes
obtained by Aref does not reflect the 122 seats the reformists had supposedly
obtained in the two rounds. After this defeat, Aref withdrew his candidacy
for the position, for which a vote was held two days later. On that definitive
election on 31 May, Larijani obtained 237 out of 273 votes cast, representing
an overwhelming victory that demonstrated the popularity of the veteran
6 See ‘Iran election: Reformists win all 30 Tehran seats’, BBC, 28 February 2016;
‘Reformists win in Tehran province as Iran awaits election results’, CNN, 1 March 2016.
7 See اھشیارگ لودج + «سلجم» تاباختنا جیاتن (Election results, Majlis + Table Trends), ISNA,
10 Esfand 1394 (29 February 2016) (http://www.isna.ir/news/94121006540).
8 For more information, see ‘Isfahan candidate disqualified despite voter support’,
Radiozamaneh, 22 March 2016.
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conservative politician. The reformist candidate Mostafa Kevakebian
obtained only 11 votes. However, the reformists managed to secure the first
deputy speakership, with Masoud Pezeskhian receiving 158 votes. Ali
Motahari, leader of the Voice of the Nation list, became the second deputy
speaker after obtaining 133 votes.9
It is worth highlighting the similarities between the Assembly of
Experts and Majlis elections in terms of list composition and assessment of
results. The composition of the 16-candidate member list for the Tehran
district for the Assembly of Experts was even more blurry than that for the
Majlis. The two main lists, the conservative one led by Ahmad Jannati,
Mohammad Yazdi, and Taqi Mesbah, and the «Hope» list led by Hashemi
Rafsanjani and Hassan Rohani, shared seven candidates. This made it almost
impossible to assert that there were real ideological differences among them,
except for those heading the lists. Among these seven, five obtained a seat,
which further complicates the attribution of a victory to either of the two lists.
The same phenomenon took place in most districts. Moreover, in some of
them there was just a single list proposed to the voters.
The results of the Assembly of Experts elections nevertheless contain
some very significant data. Hashemi Rafsanjani, defeated by Ahmadinejad
in the 2005 presidential elections, having lost all his popularity and almost
politically dead after 2009, seemed to have regained his charisma among
Tehranians. He was the most popular candidate with 2,3 million votes, even
more than current President Rouhani, who obtained 2,2 million votes, or than
Aref in the legislative elections.10 The veteran politician seemed to have had
his thousandth – and last – political comeback. This result also seems to be
enhanced by the conservatives’ defeat in Tehran, where they were not able
to obtain a seat in the assembly for their two main figures, Yazdi and Mesbah.
In sum, these two elections combined were a victory for the candidates
and groups who support President Rouhani, which represent a parliament
that will not oppose his foreign policy and his foreseeable economic
initiatives to attract foreign investments. However, it was not a political
opening like the one brought on by the reformist President Mohammad
Khatami in 1997. Finally, this was a victory for the «centrists» in the
assembly, which would guarantee a smooth transition in case a new leader
of the Republic needs to be elected. Nevertheless, the election of the very
conservative Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council since 1980, as
speaker of the assembly, after obtaining 51 out of 88 votes,11 shows that even
9 See ‘A selection of the latest news stories and articles published in Iranian news outlets,
compiled by AEI Critical Threats Analysts’, Critical Threats, 31 May 2016; and ‘Larijani
re-elected Iran’s Tenth Majlis Speaker’, Press TV, 31 May 2016.
10 See ‘Final Results of Parliamentary, Expert Assembly Polls in Tehran Released’, Al
Alam, 29 February 2016.
11 See ‘Jannati next chair of Iran's Assembly of Experts’, Mehr News, 24 May 2016.
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apparent alliances within the chamber do not match with the arguable victory
of reformists-moderates in the elections. On the contrary, they reflect the
continued control by the conservatives over the key institutions of the
Republic, which can be expected to guarantee the survival of the system and
the clerical elite in power.
2.2. The institutional struggle
A side effect of the legislative elections was a new chapter in the
institutional confrontation within the Islamic Republic. The above-
mentioned disqualification of Hassan Khomeini, followed by the
unprecedented disqualification of a female reformist candidate, Minoo
Khaleghi, after she won her seat for the Isfahan district, brought to the fore a
discussion about the electoral oversight role of the Guardian Council. In a
very confrontational tone, Rafsanjani – head of the Expediency Council, the
third most powerful institution of the country – asked, «Who gave the
Guardian Council the right to vet candidates? Where did you get your
qualifications? Who allowed you to judge?»12 Those comments generated a
wave of criticism against the veteran politician from the hardliners, who even
requested the same Guardian Council to disqualify Rafsanjani from the
Assembly of Experts elections.
The Majlis also engaged in the institutional dispute in September by
passing a bill limiting the Guardian Council’s electoral vetting powers. The
bill stated that the council cannot disqualify a candidate after the vetting
process has finished, meaning two weeks before the elections are held. Since
all legislation also must be approved by the Guardians, the bill was rejected
and returned to the parliament, which re-approved the resolution in
October.13 The bill was again rejected by the end of October, and even
though Expediency Discernment Council conservative member Dorri
Najafabadi asked for comprehensive electoral reform, the legislative dispute
remains unresolved.14
12 See ‘دیداد ماما تیب ھب یدب ھیدھ :یناجنسفریمشاھ’ (‘Hashemi Rafsanjani: Imam gave a bad gift’),
Asiran, 1 February 2016 (http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/448133/ یمشاھیناجنسفر-ھیدھ-یدب-
ھب-تیب-ماما-دیداد ).
13 See ‘ یاھدزمان تیحلاص رد نابھگن یاروش رظنراھظا قح ندرک دودحم لیلد ھب سلجم ھیراسفتسا :ییادخدک
دش در تاباختنا’ (Kadkhodaie: Guardian Council rejected Majlis enquire regarding candidates
rejections.), Jamaran, 20 Shahrivar 1395 (10 September 2016)
(http://www.jamaran.ir/ شخب-رابخا-12/143347-ییادخدک-ھیراسفتسا-سلجم-ھب-لیلد-دودحم-ندرک-قح-
رظنراھظا-یاروش-نابھگن-رد-تیحلاص-یاھدزمان-تاباختنا-در-دش-یارب-مزلا-ارجلاا-ندش-دنمزاین-ھبوصم-
سلجم-تسا-نم-ار-دراو-یزاب-یاھ-یسایس-دینکن ).
14 For more information, see Pendleton Caitlin Shayda ‘Iran’s Guardian Council Pushes the
Limits of Its Electoral Control,’ Critical Threats, 20 May 2016.
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In a parallel move, Supreme Leader Khamenei released on 15 October
18 general guidelines for elections that focussed primarily on campaign
financing, external support, and vote-buying. Khamenei also referred to an
accurate vetting of candidates, supporting the Guardian Council’s «final say
in approving candidates», «investigating complaints», and «confirming or
annulling elections».15 The guidelines also reiterated a ban on the armed
forces from interfering in elections.
2.3. The reappearance of Ahmadinejad and the conservatives
One of the most interesting political developments during 2016 was the
reappearance of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the political arena. The former
president had been maintaining a low profile since the end of his mandate in
August 2013. The failed support for his closest collaborator, Esfandiar
Rahim Mashaei, for the last presidential elections meant a strong setback for
his political career. During the March legislative elections, Ahmadinejad had
been gathering his former ministers and collaborators, towards the
consolidation of a group within the «principlists» (conservatives) who would
support his ideas in the parliament. He had also been mobilizing his followers
in several provincial rallies, taking advantage of his still strong popularity in
rural areas.
His last public act in August had doubtlessly attracted worldwide
attention. He wrote an open letter to US President Barack Obama, criticising
his lack of change towards Iran despite the JCPOA, and demanding the
removal of the US$ 2,000 million freeze of Iranian funds, which had been
supported by a US Supreme Court ruling.16 This being a symbolic letter, it
represented a re-entry in the international scene by Ahmadinejad, following
his own tradition of missives to Obama and George Bush.
Even though Iranian presidential election results have proved to be
unpredictable since 1997, a very reliable survey conducted by IPOS in
February 2015 showed a small difference in voting intention, with 28% for
Rouhani and 24% for Ahmadinejad. The same survey instrument indicated
an increased margin in 2016, with 41% for Rouhani and 29% for
Ahmadinejad.17 Without doubt, the endorsement of the JCPOA in July 2015,
15 See Office of the Leader, ‘ تکرش تاباختنا رد یلم تزع و رابتعا شیازفا دصق ھب و تریصب اب مدرم ھمھ
أم ار نمشد وسویدننک ’ (‘All the people will enhance the dignity and credibility of the elections
and disappoint the enemy’), Press release, 7 Esfand 1394 (26 February 2016)
(http://www.leader.ir/fa/content/14297/ روضح-ربھر-مظعم-بلاقنا-یملاسا-رد-نیمھد-هرود-تاباختنا-
سلجم-یاروش-یملاسا-و-نیمجنپ-هرود-تاباختنا-سلجم-ناگربخ-یربھر ).
16 See ‘Former Iranian President Ahmadinejad Pens Letter to Obama’, Tasnim News, 8
August 2016.
17 See ‘2017 Presidential Elections: Rouhani 41%, Ahmadinejad 29%’, IPOS, 25 May
2016.
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the hope for economic improvement, and the victory of Rouhani’s followers
in the legislative elections worked in his favour, although Ahmadinejad’s
support had also grown, and would have been encouraging to launch his
candidacy.
His intended reappearance, however, was rapidly dismissed by the
Leader, who clearly prohibited Ahmadinejad from running for a third term
in the upcoming 2017 elections. Khamenei stated on September 26 that ‘a
man came to me, and I told him that it would currently be in his interests and
the interests of the country for him not to participate in a certain issue. I did
not tell him not to participate. I said I do not consider it to be expedient.’
Khamenei stated that Ahmadinejad’s candidacy «would polarize the
country.»18 In a quick reaction, Ahmadinejad replied, «I do not plan on
participating in next year’s election. Keeping with the will of the leader of
the great revolution, I have no plans to be present in the presidential
competitions next year.»19
Even though the threat represented by Ahmadinejad disappeared by
October, Rouhani’s government had already faced strong criticism from
the conservative and hard-line factions that forced the resignation of some of
his ministers during 2016. On 19 October, Minister of Culture and Islamic
Guidance Ali Jannati, Minister of Education Ali Asghar Fani, and Minister
of Sports and Youth Affairs Mahmoud Goudarzi all submitted their
resignations following several controversies on the implementation of
policies. Jannati, for instance, had permitted a controversial concert in the
city of Qom, severely criticized by the hardliners. Moreover, Fani was
undergoing impeachment proceedings within the Majlis. By 1 November, the
replacements of the three ministers – Reza Salehi Amiri as Minister of
Culture and Islamic Guidance, Massoud Soltani Far as Minister of Sports
and Youth Affairs, and Fakhreddin Ahmadi Danesh Ashtiani as Minister of
Education – were approved by the parliament.20
2.4. The demise of Hashemi Rafsanjani
The last remarkable internal political development of the year,
however, actually took place in the first week of 2017. The demise of Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, arguably the second most powerful politician in
18 See ‘دینک تکرش ھیضق نلاف رد تسین امش حلاص ھب متفگ دمآ نم دزن ھک ییاقآ ھب’ (‘I told the man who
came to me not to participate in a certain issue’), Fars News, 5 Mehr 1395 (26 September
2016) (http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950705000261).
19 See ‘مرادن هدنیآ لاس یتاباختنا یاھتباقر رد روضح یارب یاھمانرب’ (‘I do not plan to run in next
year’s elections’), Fars News, 4 Mehr 1395 (25 September 2016)
(http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950706000704).
20 See ‘Rouhani’s picks for 3 ministries win lawmakers’ confidence vote’, Press TV, 1
November 2016.
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the Islamic Republic, represented the end of an era within the Islamic
Revolution, and the beginning of a new uncertain one for current President
Rouhani and the pragmatists, moderates, and reformist groups.
The unexpected death happened on 8 January, and even though the
consequences are not yet clear, it is possible to say that Rouhani as well as
the reformists will suffer from the disappearance of his main ally and
supporter. The funeral, held at Tehran University on 10 January, was
attended by hundreds of thousands of Iranians representing varied social and
political backgrounds as well as ages. However, what was clearly visible was
the affinity of the many attendants with moderate and reformist ideas. The
official ceremony, organized by the government, included an extensive
distribution of posters, banners, and publications that were rapidly printed
and installed along the route of the burial procession, from Tehran University
to the Imam Khomeini shrine. Rafsanjani was buried beside the founder of
the Republic, a great honour that to date has been granted only to him. The
posters included a broad range of photos – showing Rafsanjani with
Khomeini, Khamenei, Khatami, Rouhani, and Hassan Khomeini – covering
all periods of his life. The posters also included phrases he spoke while he
was head of the Majlis, president, and head of the Expediency Council. The
slogans chanted by the massive crowd went from the traditional «death to
America» and «Allah akbar» to some more critical to the establishment, such
as «ya Hussein, Mir Hussein» and others showing the affinity between
Rafsanjani, current President Rouhani, and former reformist President
Mohammad Khatami. Khatami, in fact, was prevented from attending the
funeral by the government, in an attempt to prevent the ceremony from
becoming a pro-reformist gathering that could have provoked the reaction of
the security forces.21
Even though the chances for Rouhani to be re-elected may not be
affected by this, it is certainly true that no one is currently entitled to be an
intermediary between the most hard-line groups and the reformists as
Rafsanjani was. Moreover, Leader Khamenei actually remains the only close
disciple of Khomeini still alive, and occupying the highest position in the
Islamic Republic without any strong figure that counterbalances his power.
The reformist groups may also be suffering from the disappearance of
someone who protected them against the attacks coming from the hardliners.
Even though Rafsanjani’s popularity had ups and downs since 2005, there
was a strong feeling among the youngest generations that he was the most
experienced and moderate politician in the country, the one who could
prevent the radicalization of government and preserve the internal peace.22
21 Personal observations of the author while attending Rafsanjani’s funeral, Tehran, 10
January 2017.
22 Personal considerations based on several interviews and informal conversations
conducted with Iranian scholars, Tehran, 10 to 12 January 2017.
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3. Economy
The economic performance of Rouhani’s administration during 2016
was broadly linked to the achievements of the JCPOA and its internal and
external effects. While some improvements were visible in terms of new
business opportunities and agreements with foreign companies, such as
Airbus and Boeing, strong impediments were still affecting other areas, such
as Iran’s reincorporation into the international SWIFT banking system.
Moreover, the continued low price of oil during the year prevented Iran from
having a better financial situation, which started to improve only after the
December OPEC deal that ended the decreasing trend due to the
implementation of productions quotas for OPEC members, as well as others
like Russia that also subscribed the deal.
3.1. Outlook for the financial-economic situation
According to official statistics, the inflation rate dropped in 2016 to
single digits for the first time in 25 years, remaining below 9.6% throughout
the year. This was a clear achievement, since Rouhani’s tenure began with
an inflation rate of 40% and he managed to reduce it to an average of 15%
during his first two years of government.23 The Dollar-Rial exchange rate,
one of the indicators that directly affects the Iranian population – since the
dollar constitutes Iranians’ primary currency for savings and exchange – did
not improve drastically during 2016. According to Iranian Central Bank
information, the year started with an official exchange rate of 30,178 IR/1
US dollar, and it finished with 32,399.24 However, in the first week of
January 2017, the free market exchange rate was 39,000 IR/USD. The other
challenging indicator, unemployment, seems to resist any governmental
policy to tackle it, not having been affected by the prospect of foreign
investments following the lifting of sanctions. While in August 2013, when
Rouhani’s tenure started, unemployment was at 10.5%, the year 2016
finished at 12.4%, according to non-official data.25
23 See available data at Central Bank of Iran, ‘Consumer Price Index’
(http://www.cbi.ir/category/1624.aspx) and Trading Economics, ‘Iran Inflation Rates’
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi).
24 See Central Bank of Iran, ‘Foreign Exchange Rate’
(http://www.cbi.ir/exrates/rates_en.aspx).
25 See ‘Iran Unemployment Rates’, Trading Economics
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate).
Asia Maior, vol. XXVII
368
The promising prospects for foreign investments haven’t yet been
accomplished, despite hundreds of memorandums of understanding signed
with either governments or foreign companies.
The external and internal constraints have made the actual amount of
investment and commercial transactions not very meaningful so far. These
constraints include the lack of a legal framework for certain areas, such as
retail, joint ventures, or even private property in the hands of foreign
companies. They also include the still very unclear situation of foreign
investment and business transactions that are allowed or banned by the
multiple sanctions that have affected Iran since 2006.26
Importantly, the sanctions that affected the Iranian link with the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) were
removed following the JCPOA implementation day on 16 January 2016.
Banks that specifically remain sanctioned under EU laws, however, would
not be allowed to reconnect to SWIFT.27 At the end of 2016, SWIFT codes
were already active for 286 Iranian banks and branches;28 however, so far
only 25 foreign banks, mainly Asian and smaller international ones, have
established brokerage links with Iranian entities. Another 100 have started
negotiations, according to Gholamreza Panahi, vice governor for foreign
exchange affairs at Bank Meli Iran.29 However, this statement is contradicted
by reports that links were established with 264 foreign banks in March.30
Simply put, the initial negotiations seem not to be as easy as expected, and
foreign banks, mainly the most important ones from Europe and the US,
prefer to be cautious in re-establishing links with Iranian firms.
A remarkable improvement during 2016, on the other hand, was the
accomplishment of a long-awaited long-term agreement with Airbus that
materialized with the landing of the first A-321 in Tehran’s Mehrabad
Airport on 12 January 2017. During the year, contradictory information had
been published in Iranian media outlets regarding the number of planes and
actual expenditures on sales contracts with Airbus, and later with the
American company Boeing, which represented expansion plans for state-
26 In an interview conducted in Tehran on 12 January 2017, a lawyer who works at a private
firm specializing in foreign investments mentioned that she had to suggest ad hoc
regulations to the Ministry of Finance, in order to create a legal framework to apply to some
international contracts that had never been conducted before, since there was no possibility
to have them done within the current economic and property system.
27See ‘امیپاوھ ١١۴ دیرخ یارب سابریا اب قفاوت’ (‘Agreement with Airbus to buy 114 airplanes’),
Tasnim News,  26 Dey 1394 (16 January 2016)
(https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1394/10/26/972898/ قفاوت-اب-سابریا-یارب-دیرخ-114-
امیپاوھ).
28 See the Iranian Banks’ SWIFT Code list at http://www.swift-code.com/iran.
29 See ‘Iranian banks improving foreign relations in post-sanction era’, IRNA, 14 January
2017, and ‘Day Bank in transactions with 100 foreign banks’, IRNA, 11 January 2017.
30 See ‘Iran Links Up With 264 International Banks’, Financial Tribune, 16 March 2016.
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owned Iran Air. In January 2016, during a visit to Paris by President Hassan
Rouhani, a major contract was signed with Airbus to buy 118 planes worth
about US$ 27 billion. Negotiations accelerated in October 2016 following
the US decision to remove a final impediment for Western aircraft
manufacturers to sell planes to Iran under contracts signed after the
enforcement of the JCPOA. This approval is necessary, since Airbus buys
more than 40% of all its aircraft parts from US companies. Iran sealed
another deal with Boeing in June for the purchase of 100 passenger planes
worth around US$ 25 billion. In December, the deal with Boeing was
finalized, allowing Iran to buy 80 planes within 10 years, with a first plane
expected in 2018.31
Another area of improvement was with the automobile industry. In June,
the French manufacturer Peugeot Citroen signed a joint venture agreement
with Iran’s largest automobile manufacturer, Iran Khodro, that will invest
€400 million over the next five years in manufacturing and research and
development.32
3.2. Prospects for the oil industry after the JCPOA
The biggest achievement in economic terms is related to the
improvement in oil production and its price, a field that might help Iran and
its government to enhance its situation and stability. Oil prices remained
below US$ 50 per barrel during the whole year, and even below US$ 45
during October and November, due to the impossibility of reaching a
reduction agreement within the OPEC framework. The intransigence of
Saudi Arabia in accepting a reduction of its own quota also contributed to
this low price. 33 But a preliminary deal was finally reached in early
December with an overall reduction in 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd), also
including non-OPEC states such as Russia, which promised a reduction of
300,000 bpd. Iran, instead, was allowed to increase its production in 200,00
bpd, to compensate for the reductions incurred during sanctions since 2008.
As a consequence, Iran finished the year producing more than 4.2 million
bpd, while at the beginning the production was 3.3 m/bpd. The price slowly
31 See ‘Iran to Get First Purchased Airbus Aircraft Thursday’, Tasnim News, 8 January
2017.
32 See ‘PSA signs JV deal with Iran Khodro’, Press TV, 21 June 2016.
33 It is worth mentioning that since the establishment of sanctions against Iranian oil
exports, Saudi Arabia replaced the quota that Iran could not fulfil. Then, Saudi Arabia was
reluctant to recover the pre-sanctions production quota, according to some analysts, in an
attempt to keep a low price that would render shale oil production unprofitable. The low
prices would only benefit those states, like Saudi Arabia, with very low production costs,
while affecting other producers such as the US, Russia, and mainly Iran.
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increased, as the year finished with the Brent crude oil price above US$
53/barrel.34
The agreement defied expectations, indicating that both Iran and Saudi
Arabia can prioritize economics over regional confrontation, bearing in mind
that both states were failing to cover domestic spending and foreign
adventures in regional conflicts. According to the International Monetary
Fund, Iran needs the price of oil at US$ 55/barrel to break even, while Saudi
Arabia needs US$ 80. However, the agreement was considered mainly as a
victory for Iran in both political and economic terms, since its negotiators
managed to convince the OPEC as well as Russian partners that coming back
to the quota system was the only possible solution to stop the falling prices.
In economic terms, it also proved that Iran suffered fewer negative effects
from oil price fluctuation than their regional partners, since the national
budget is not massively relying on oil income as it was in the past. The annual
budget for the fiscal year March 2016–March 2017 was calculated based on
oil prices of US$ 35 to US$ 40/barrel, and an average oil production of 2.25
million bpd.35 According to those figures, oil revenues would account for
34.6% of state expenditures, compared with 25.8% under the previous
budget. 36 Thus, progressive implementation of taxes represented a huge
change in a rentier based economy, making Iran less vulnerable to irregular
prices and possible production cuts.
Last, but not least, the prospect for foreign investment in oil technology
remains intact, with Royal Dutch Shell restarting its purchases of Iranian
crude oil in June 2017. Shell will be the second major oil company after the
French firm Total to resume oil purchases with Iran after the nuclear-related
sanctions were lifted in January.37 Nonetheless, 2016 proved also to be a
problematic year for achieving new joint venture projects to increase
production and refinery capacity.
34 See ‘Iran crude oil Production’, Trading Economics
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/crude-oil-production) and ‘OPEC Monthly Oil
Market Report’, OPEC, 14 December 2016
(http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/MOM
R%20December%202016.pdf).
35 See ‘داد شھاک ار یعافد یداھنشیپ ھجدوب تلود’ (The government reduced the defense budget),
Raja News, 27 Dey 1394 (17 January 2016) (http://www.rajanews.com/news/231961), and
‘  لاس ھجدوب95ب مقر ابشی زا978م رازھدرایلیوصت ناموتبیدش ’ (Year 95 budget was approved with
more than 978 billion dollars), Fars News, 31 Farvardin 1395 (19 April 2016)
(http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950131000598).
36See Alireza Ramezani, ‘Rouhani’s budget proposal reverses declining reliance on oil’, Al
Monitor, 12 December 2016.
37 See  Rupert Rowling, Angelina Rascouet, and Julian Lee, ‘Shell Follows Total in Buying
Iranian Crude After Sanctions End’, Bloomberg, 8 June 2016.
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4. Foreign policy
4.1. Troubled Iran-Saudi relations
Iranian foreign policy during 2016 was marked by increased bilateral
tensions with Saudi Arabia since the attack on its embassy in Tehran and
consulate in Mashad on 2 January, following the execution of the Saudi Shi’a
cleric Nimr al Nimr. Bilateral tensions were then aggravated by Iran’s direct
involvement in the Syrian war, as well as its alleged intervention in
supporting the Huthi rebellion in Yemen. Both actions are considered by
Saudi Arabia as illegitimate Iranian meddling in Arab countries’ affairs.
Moreover, implementation of the JCPOA on 16 January meant for Saudi
Arabia and other Arab states that Iran was empowered to support the Syrian
regime of Bashar al-Assad, as well as Huthis in Yemen and the Iraqi Shi’a
militias, without any impediment. By the end of 2015, Saudi Arabia
announced the formation of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism
(IMAFT), an intergovernmental military alliance of Muslim and Arab
countries to officially intervene against the Islamic State (IS) and other
terrorist groups. The coalition was allegedly composed of 34 members at its
launch,38 reaching 39 by March 2016, and 40 by December, with Oman the
last country to join in. Neither Iran, Iraq, nor Lebanon were invited to join
the alliance, which raised the plausible concern of it being effectively an anti-
Shi’a coalition. The organization was based at the Joint Command Center in
Riyadh, and created by Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s
Minister of Defense, on 15 December 2015.39 Shortly after, in early February
2016, Saudi officials began to publicly mention the possibility of direct Saudi
intervention in Syria. The military spokesman, Brigadier General Ahmed al-
Asiri, stated that ‘the kingdom is ready to participate in any ground
operations that the coalition [against IS] may agree to carry out in Syria.’40
These deployments would be coordinated with Turkish forces. Later on,
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir confirmed Saudi readiness in a
German newspaper interview by stating that «if a decision is taken to send in
special units against IS, Saudi Arabia is ready to take part.»41 It is worth
38 Some countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia, were included in the official
Saudi launching statement without being consulted, and their authorities expressed their
suprised and in some cases rejection to join the military alliance. See ‘«Members» surprised
by Saudi anti-terror coalition plan’, BBC News, 16 December 2015; and ‘Pakistan surprised
by its inclusion in 34-nation military alliance’, Dawn, 16 December 2015.
39 See ‘Joint statement on formation of Islamic military alliance to fight terrorism’, Saudi
Press Agency, 15 December 2015.
40 See Ian Black, ‘Saudi Arabia offers to send ground troops to Syria to fight Isis’, The
Guardian, 4 February 2016.
41 See ‘Syria: Turkey and Saudi Arabia consider ground campaign following border
strikes’, The Guardian, 14 February 2016.
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noting again that 16 January was «Implementation Day» for JCPOA,
meaning that all technical aspects of the deal, such as lifting of sanctions by
the UN Security Council and the EU, would come into effect.
In that regard, it is not a coincidence for some Iranian officials that the
execution of the Saudi Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr was on 2 January 2016.42
They believed that Riyadh wanted to send a clear message to Tehran that the
kingdom would take a very proactive and assertive posture to guarantee its
security. Some assumed that the Saudi decision was taken in order to provoke
a direct reaction from the most radical factions inside the Iranian regime in
an attempt to destabilize Rouhani’s government. According to this thinking,
this would show the world that behind the diplomatic approach of Rouhani’s
administration there were hardliners with a more radical posture that was
dangerous for regional stability. The reaction was as expected, and on the
same day a crowd of protesters attacked the Saudi consulate in Mashhad and
later stormed the embassy in Tehran. The latter building was set on fire with
Molotov cocktails, but no one from the diplomatic delegations was injured.
Even without considering the execution a foreign policy decision, but
perhaps an internal one aimed at giving a clear signal to all the opposition
forces within Saudi Arabia including both Shia and Salafist followers, what
is debatable is the timing of the execution.
Although Iranian President Rouhani condemned the attack, as did
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the government announced that the
attackers would be identified and prosecuted, the Saudi authorities decided
to sever diplomatic ties with Iran. Saudi Foreign Minister al Jubeir recalled
the ambassador in Tehran and expelled the Iranian one in Riyadh, declaring
him persona non grata. The other GCC states also condemned the attack, but
only Bahrain followed Saudi’s action. The United Arab Emirates only
downgraded its diplomatic relations, and Qatar recalled its ambassador, a
clear disappointment for the Saudi king, who expected uniform support from
its GCC partners. Saudi Arabia called for an emergency meeting of the Arab
League in Cairo on 4 January, at which they condemned the attacks and the
Iranian government for failing to protect the embassies. In a statement
released after the meeting, the Arab League also condemned the reported
discovery by Bahrain of a militant group that it claimed was backed by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards. All member states voted in favour of the resolution
except Lebanon.43 However, only Sudan, Somalia, Comoros, and Djibouti
severed ties with Iran, representing another disappointment for the Saudi
authorities.
42 See ‘Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia executes top Shia cleric’, BBC News, 2 January
2016.
43 See ‘Arab League condemns Saudi embassy attack’, Al Arabiya, 10 January 2016, and
‘Arab League backs Saudis in Iran row’, Al Jazeera, 11 January 2016.
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A judiciary process eventually took place in Iran, and a trial against 20
individuals accused of «deliberately destroying» the Saudi embassy ended in
3 November, with some individuals sentenced to six months of
imprisonment. Most of them, however, were sentenced to only 91 days of
imprisonment.44
Bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran further deteriorated.
The Saudi government banned its citizens from traveling to Iran and cut all
air connections, announced by the Civil Aviation Authority. 45 Licenses
granted to Iranian Mahan Air were also suspended, meaning that it became
more difficult for Iranian citizens to do pilgrimage to Mecca.46 Even though
the Saudi authorities stated that the diplomatic rift would not affect the
Iranian pilgrims, Rouhani’s government decided, for the first time, to ban its
citizens from performing the Hajj or Umrah, citing lack of safety
assurances.47 The controversial decision was heavily criticized by Iranians,
being one of the reasons behind the resignation of Minister of Culture and
Islamic Guidance Ali Jannati. It is worth mentioning that Iranian officials
repeatedly criticized Saudi Arabia for what they perceived as their
mismanagement of the Hajj, after a stampede in Mina during the 2015 Hajj
left more than 2,000 people dead, including almost 500 Iranians.
The tension with Saudi Arabia also extended to other areas, including
even football. Saudi clubs asked the Saudi Arabian Football Federation and
Asian Football Confederation to move international games out of Iran due to
security concerns following the attacks to the Saudi diplomatic buildings.48
Finally, an increasing «cyberwar» was expected from Iran, after the attack
on several official Iranian websites by a Saudi hacker.49 Following the very
harmful experience of the Stuxnet virus that affected some nuclear facilities,
Iran was particularly worried about the capacity of their enemies to reach
sensitive areas inside their governmental and technological networks.
The external pressure over Iran was also visible in March 2016, when
the Arab League summit declared Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, with
44 See ‘ماھتا زا ناتسبرع ترافس ھب ھلمح نامھتم ھئربت’ (‘Saudi embassy attack suspects acquitted
from charges’), Donya-e Eqtesad, 12 Aban 1395 (2 November 2016) (http://donya-e-
eqtesad.com/SiteKhan/1123578).
45 See ‘Saudi bans travel to Iran; UN Security Council condemns attack’, Emirates 24/7
News, 5 January 2016.
46 See ‘Saudi Arabia Bans Iran's Mahan Air, Citing Safety Concerns’, Radio Free Europe,
5 April 2016.
47 See ‘تسا نیملسم رمایلو ھب طونم ،عتمت جح هرابرد یعرش میمصت’ (‘The decision on the Hajj depends
on the Valy-e of Muslims’), ISNA, 15 Dey 1394 (5 January 2016)
(http://www.isna.ir/news/94101508778/ میمصت-یعرش-هرابرد-جح-عتمت-طونم-ھب-یلو-رما-نیملسم-
تسا).
48 See James Dorsey, ‘Saudi-Iranian Diplomatic Row Moves to Soccer’, Fair Observer, 5
January 2016.
49 See Shahin Azimi, ‘Iran-Saudi tensions erupt in «cyberwar»’, BBC News, 3 June 2016.
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the only opposition from Iraq and Lebanon.50 The same decision had been
taken a few days before by the GCC states. The OIC Summit held in Istanbul
also expressed condemnation of Iran’s behaviour and interference in the
internal affairs of other regional countries, as follows:
The Conference rejected Iran’s inflammatory statements on the
execution of judicial decisions against the perpetrators of terrorist
crimes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, considering those
statements a blatant interference in the internal affairs of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a contravention of the United Nations
Charter, the OIC Charter and of all international covenants.51
4.2. Iranian involvement in Syria
The Iranian involvement in Syria was, without hesitation, the most
controversial aspect of Iranian foreign policy during 2016. Iranian support
for the Assad regime was clearly reproduced by all segments of the political,
clerical, and military establishment. Iranian direct intervention was evident
during the year not only in Syria but also in Iraq, fighting against IS/DAESH
(al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī ʿIrāq wa l-Shām), and in support of its regional
allies. According to Revolutionary Guard Commander Mohammad Ali
Jafari, Iran had «over 200,000 armed youths in regional countries» 52
demonstrating the Iranian mobilization capability to support its regional
interests. The Iranian press, published mainly in Farsi, extensively detailed
all the Iranian, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters that were killed on the Syrian
battlefield, and therefore considered as martyrs.53 The deceased in Syria also
included clerics as well as high-ranked IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps) officials, such as Brig. Gen. Mohsen Ghajarian, and members of the
50 See ‘Arab League labels Hezbollah a «terrorist» group’, Al Jazeera, 12 March 2016.
51 See OIC ‘Final Communique of the 13th Islamic Summit Conference’, 15 April 2016
(https://oic2016istanbulsummit.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Final_Communique.pdf).
52 See ‘تسا یملاسا بلاقنا تاکرب و تازجعم زا یکی نموم ناوج لسن’ (‘A faithful young generation
is one of the miracles and blessings of the Islamic Revolution’), Fars News, 22 Dey 1394
(12 January 2016) (http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13941022001259).
53 See, for instance ‘دش ییادخ «یمرب هدازیلع دیعس» /ناغماد رد مرح عفادم دیھش عییشت’ (‘Funeral for
martyred defenders at Damghan shrine’), Mehr News, 13 Bahman 1394 (2 February 2016)
(http://www.mehrnews.com/news/3040385/ عییشت-دیھش-عفادم-مرح-رد-ناغماد-دیعس-هدازیلع-یمرب-
ییادخ-دش ); and ‘ واصرید مرح عفادم تفھ/رگیھش ناتسود ھبناشدیپدنتسوی ’ (‘Seven defenders joined the
martyrdom’), Fars News, 13 Bahman 1394 (2 February 2016).
(http://www.farsnews.com/13941113001540).
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Artesh, the regular army that is conducting advisory missions.54 The heavy
financial cost of the Syrian war was also reflected in aid provided to the
Syrian government, as Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated when
recognizing that Iran had sent US$ 2.8 billion in aid to Syria.55
The official justification regarding this controversial Iranian
involvement in the conflict is linked to the fight against terrorist groups such
as IS/DAESH and the Al Nusra front. Both groups are considered a serious
and real threat not only for Iranian allies, but for Iran itself. There is a general
understanding among Iranians, including the intellectual and diplomatic
community, that the strategic defence of Iran currently extends beyond its
territorial borders, and that failing to defeat these groups in Syrian or Iraqi
scenarios could portend a future direct territorial confrontation along the
Iranian borders, or even within the country.56
4.2. The United States and the JCPOA
Iranian relations with the United States suffered from ups and downs
during 2016. The implementation of the JCPOA brought some relief to the
bilateral relations, and both the Obama and Rouhani administrations
managed to keep their most radical sectors outside the political debate in
order to proceed with the nuclear deal. The good mood helped to resolve
some non-related issues such as the quick liberation of two US Navy vessels
and 10 sailors, on 13 January. After a purported mechanical error that caused
the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters, they were detained by
Iranian forces. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari stated that
this was an involuntary and non-hostile act, quickly solved, although it was
one of the issues discussed by US Secretary of State John Kerry and Zarif.57
On the other hand, Iranian authorities also freed four Iranian-Americans on
54 See ‘سکع + ھیروس رد هاپس (ع)اضر ماما یھرز 21 پیت هدنامرف تداھش’ (‘Martyrdom of the Imam
Reza 21 Armored Brigade Army Commander in Syria’), ABNA, 14 Bahman 1394 (3
February 2016)
(http://fa.abna24.com/service/iran/archive/2016/02/03/698435/story.html).
55 See ‘تسا هدرک کمک ھیروس ھب رلاد درایلیم  نونک ات ناریا :فیرظ’ (‘Zarif: Iran has so far
contributed 2.8 billion dollars to Syria’), Radio Farda, 15 Bahman 1394 (4 February 2016)
(http://www.radiofarda.com/a/f4_zarif_iran_help_syria_2_billion_dollar/27532556.html).
56 Several interviews conducted in Tehran and Qom, between Iranian scholars, students,
diplomats, and religious scholars in February 2016 and January 2017 corroborated this
official narrative.
57 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Spokesman: US marines entry to Iranian territorial
water was not hostile’, Press release, 13 January 2016; and ‘ مصتمییریگ نارادگنفت درومرد
رمآییاکیدوب دھاوخ بتارم ھسلس روتسداب ’ (‘The decision about the US marines will be taken by
the hierarchy’), Mehr News, 23 Dey 1394 (13 January 2016)
(http://www.mehrnews.com/news/3023790/ میمصت-یریگ-درومرد-نارادگنفت-ییاکیرمآ-روتسداب-
ھسلس-بتارم-دھاوخ ).
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16 January, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian, in exchange
for the release of seven Iranians held in the US for sanctions evasion. In
addition, the US also dropped charges and Interpol arrest notices against 14
other Iranians. 58
In contrast, the American government kept the pressure on Iran, since
the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned 11 entities and individuals
linked to Tehran’s ballistic missile program in the same month of January.59
Concurrently, a US Supreme Court decision allowed the victims of terrorist
attacks attributed to Iran to collect almost US$ 2 billion in frozen Iranian
assets on 16 June.60 More important, on 1 December the Iran Sanction Act,
established by President Bill Clinton, was renewed for another 10-year
term.61 All these measures were strongly criticized inside Iran. The ISA
renewal was considered by Khamenei and some other high-rank officials as
an enactment of new sanctions, rather than an extension of previous ones,
thus, a violation of the JCPOA commitments from the US side.62
There is still uncertainty regarding the position that President Donald
Trump will take regarding the JCPOA. However, despite the heavy anti-
Iranian discourse which characterised Trump’s presidential campaign, most
of the interviewed scholars in Tehran showed relative optimism. They argued
that, regardless of Trump’s personal approach, the JCPOA involves
numerous countries and organizations, and that the US alone cannot abrogate
the deal without triggering a general backlash within the international
community. Some also argued that the common interests that were always
present in both American and Iranian positions regarding al-Qāʿida,
IS/DAESH, and other terrorist groups should help to reinforce instead of
weaken the bilateral relations.
Regardless of the future Iranian policy of President Trump, the Iranian
government reassured its commitment towards the JCPOA, fulfilling the
requirements established and according to the stipulated timeline. In this
regard, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) confirmed on 14
January 2016 that the Arak reactor core was removed and filled with cement,
thereby disabling its ability to produce the levels of plutonium required for a
58 See ‘Jason Rezaian and 3 Other US Inmates Freed by Iran’, Fars News, 16 June 2016.
59 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic
Missile Procurement for Iran’, Press release, 17 January 2016
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0322.aspx).
60 See International Court of Justice, ‘Iran institutes proceedings against the United States
with regard to a dispute concerning alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity’, Press
Release No. 2016/19, 15 June 2016 (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/164/19032.pdf).
61 See Patricia Zengerle, ‘Extension of Iran Sanctions Act Passes U.S. Congress’, Reuters,
1 December 2016.
62 See Office of the Supreme Leader, ‘Extension of expired sanctions, breach of JCPOA
commitments’, 27 November 2016 (http://leader.ir/en/content/16835/The-Leader%27s-
meeting-Navy-commanders-and-officials).
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nuclear weapon. This action was a precondition to be certified by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to proceed to the
JCPOA implementation by 16 January after issuing a report verifying Iran’s
compliance with its initial commitments under the nuclear deal. 63 The
United States and the European Union lifted nuclear-related sanctions in
response, although the United Nations arms embargo and sanctions on
Tehran’s ballistic missile program remain in place.
Also in accordance with the nuclear deal, Foreign Ministry spokesman
Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran had exported 32 tons of heavy water to the
US at an estimated cost of US$ 8.6 million, as well as 10 tons of 3.5%
enriched uranium to Russia, and had imported 140 tons of yellow cake from
Russia and 60 tons from Kazakhstan.64
The last report issued by the General Director of the IAEA to the Board
of Governors, on 9 November, stated that Iran was fulfilling the requirements
of transparency and collaboration with the IAEA inspectors, and that all the
steps stipulated in the JCPOA road map had been accomplished in time.
Moreover, the report stated that ‘Iran continues to provisionally apply the
Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article
17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force.’65
6. Conclusions
There are few doubts that the election of Hassan Rouhani as president
in June 2013 heralded a new phase in the history of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Rouhani was elected on a platform of moderation, pragmatism, and
reintegration of Iran into the international community. He openly criticised
the conduct of the previous administration in a number of key fields, most
notably the nuclear policy and the economic management of the country. He
also promised to improve Iran’s international standing and to bring relief to
the population after years of economic hardship. His commitment to the
international community was demonstrated by direct multilateral discussions
that began in November 2013 and concluded with implementation of the
JCPOA in January 2016. Regardless of the opposition of the most radical
sectors within Iran, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
managed to convince the Iranian population of the benefits that the nuclear
deal will bring to Iran. Even though few economic achievements are yet
63 See ‘دوش یم رپ نامیس اب اھ هرفح /میدرک جراخ ار کارا روتکآر بلق/دش مامت ام راک’ (‘Our job is done,
Arak core reactor was removed and filled with cement’), Fars News, 24 Dey 1394 (14
January 2016) (http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13941024000631).
64 See ‘Deputy FM Cautions US to Remain Loyal to N. Deal’, Fars News, 8 March 2016.
65 See the official report, ‘Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in
light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)’, GOV/2016/53, p. 5, Lett.
E, § 21 (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/11/gov2016-55.pdf).
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visible, among them commercial transactions with Iran by companies like
Airbus, Boeing, and Shell, the prospects for future improvement are still
intact, since most impediments from the sanctions have disappeared. The
lack of trust, however, evidenced by regional instability and by existing legal
and political conditions within Iran, seems to discourage the foreign
investors who are tempted to invest in Iran. The image of Iran in the region,
due to its strong support for the Assad government in Syria, may have
affected the interest of businessmen as well.
The demise in January 2017 of one of the most important figures of the
Islamic Revolution, Hashemi Rafsanjani, represents the end of a political era
in the country, and the beginning of a new one without a ‘mediator’ among
the reformist and hard-line factions within the political system. However, the
new elected parliament in February represented clear support for President
Rouhani. Since the expected economic improvements are not quite visible
yet, and foreign relations within the Persian Gulf region seems to have
deteriorated, the chances for Rouhani to be re-elected in May 2017 seem to
be more reduced than at the beginning of 2016. However, the most likely and
popular candidate who could defeat him, former President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, has been dismissed by Supreme Leader Khamenei and no
longer represents a viable political threat.
